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ABSTRACT The notion of rigidity looms large in philosophy of language, but is
beset by difficulties. This paper proposes a simple theory of rigidity, according to
which an expression has a world-relative semantic property rigidly when it has
that property at, or with respect to, all worlds. Just as names, and certain
descriptions like The square root of 4, rigidly designate their referents, so too are
necessary truths rigidly true, and so too does cat rigidly have only animals in its
extension. After spelling out the theory, I argue that it enables us to avoid the
headaches that attend the misbegotten desire to have a simple rigid/non-rigid
distinction that applies to expressions, giving us a simple solution to the problem
of generalizing the notion of rigidity beyond singular terms.
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Introduction
In Naming and Necessity Kripke argued forcefully that ordinary proper names are rigid
designators. A rigid designator designates the same object at all possible worlds in which that
object exists, and never designates anything else. To clarify - and the underlying point here is1
crucial to this paper - the idea is not that names could not have been used to name different
things. Rather, when we use names to describe counterfactual scenarios, they continue to pick
out their actual referents. By contrast, a definite description like The teacher of Alexander is a
non-rigid designator, picking out whoever taught Alexander in the counterfactual scenario that is
being described.
1 This characterization, adapted from LaPorte (2008, Introduction), deliberately leaves open the question
of whether a rigid designator should be said to designate its designatum at possible worlds where that
designatum does not exist. I touch on this issue at the end of Section 3.
The thesis that names rigidly designate their actual referents is often expressed by calling names
simply rigid. But this way of putting it encourages us to think of rigidity as a property which
expressions simply have or lack. Then, when it comes time to consider extending the notion of
rigidity beyond singular terms - and such extended use of the notion was already made in a
rough, on-the-fly sort of way in Naming and Necessity, where Kripke argued that natural kind
terms are rigid designators - we end up asking questions like ‘What does it mean to call a2
general term rigid?’. Such questions lead to proposals for extending “the” rigid/non-rigid
distinction to expressions other than singular terms, and these proposals lead to difficulties.
There is a growing literature on such difficulties, especially difficulties arising from attempts to
extend the notion of rigidity to general terms or predicates. I will argue that the problem of
generalizing the notion of rigidity is solved by a simple theory of rigidity. On this theory, rigidity
is modal invariance of a particular kind. I will spell out the theory in a moment, but to get a sense
of the kind of modal invariance I have in mind, consider the Kripkean claim that Aristotle picks
out Aristotle at all possible worlds in which Aristotle exists. This is a kind of modal invariance
claim. But it is different from the claim that the name Aristotle could not have been used to pick
out a different person. The Kripkean claim is not that in all possible worlds, Aristotle gets used
by speakers to pick out Aristotle. Rather, it is that, when we in the actual world use the name
Aristotle in describing counterfactual scenarios (possible worlds), the name picks out the same
person at, or with respect to, each scenario. This contrast is often marked by contrasting uses of
at and in, as introduced by Adams’s (1981) influential discussion of truth in vs. truth at a
possible world, helpfully summarised as follows in the Stanford Enclyclopedia of Philosophy:
One way for something to be true with respect to a world requires the truth-bearer
to exist in the world and be true there. Another way is for the truth-bearer to
“correctly describe” the world, where this does not require existing in the world.
Pollock gives the example of a picture depicting the non-existence of all pictures.
The picture could correctly depict a situation even though the situation it depicts
is one in which the picture itself does not exist. Similarly, the Medieval
philosopher Jean Buridan discusses the example of an utterance of ‘there are no
negative utterances’. This utterance correctly describes a certain possible situation
even though that situation is one in which the utterance would not exist.
Following Adams (1981), we may call the former way of being true with respect
to a world truth in a world and the latter truth at a world. (McGrath & Frank
(2018), §7.2.)
2 See Kripke (1980, Lecture III, especially p. 136).
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Thus the sort of modal invariance with which I propose to identify rigidity may be called
intralinguistic modal invariance: it is the at kind of modal invariance rather than the in kind.
Now to spell out the theory.
1 The Simple Theory
To state the simple theory of rigidity, I will use the notion of a world-relative semantic property.
I will then use the notion of a world-indexed semantic property to give an equivalent statement
of the theory that may be of additional help in understanding it. I now explain these two notions
in turn.
In the conceptual framework of possible worlds semantics, we have world-relative semantic3
properties: properties that an expression has with respect to, or at, possible worlds. For example,
consider the property of picking out Aristotle. The expression The last great philosopher of
antiquity arguably has this property with respect to the actual world, and lacks it with respect to
worlds with different histories of philosophy. By contrast, the name Aristotle, according to
Kripke at least, has this property with respect to all possible worlds, or at least all possible
worlds in which Aristotle exists. Another example of a world-relative semantic property is the
property expressed by true as used in possible worlds semantics. The expression Aristotle was
the teacher of Alexander has this property with respect to the actual world, but lacks it with
respect to worlds in which Aristotle did not teach Alexander. Other examples include the
properties of having a non-empty extension, having an extension containing more than three
members, and having a referent.4
To have a world-indexed semantic property is to have a world-relative semantic property at some
particular world. For example, consider the property of picking out Aristotle with respect to @,
where @ is the actual world. And consider the property of picking out Aristotle with respect to w,
where w is some arbitrary world in which Aristotle exists but the history of philosophy proceeds
4 Note that for this talk of world-relative semantic properties to make sense, one need not take the idea
that they are properties - that is, monadic properties - metaphysically seriously. One can understand talk
of world-relative semantic properties really to be about relations between expressions and worlds. It is
natural to talk of ‘properties’ in this context, however. Another clarificatory point: it may be asked what
semantic properties I mean to exclude with this talk of ‘world-relative semantic properties’, but if we’re
confining our attention to semantic properties as spoken of within the framework of possible worlds
semantics, the answer may be ‘none’. For even world-indexed semantic properties (in the sense about to
be explained in the main text) may be regarded as themselves being had at worlds. The terminology
should in that case just be regarded as highlighting the world-relativity of semantic properties as they
appear in possible worlds semantics.
3 See Nolan (2012) for a general philosophical introduction.
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very differently from in @. If Kripke is right about names being rigid designators, then Aristotle
possesses both of these world-indexed semantic properties, while The last great philosopher of
antiquity plausibly has the first while lacking the second. A world-indexed semantic property is
determined by a pair consisting of a world-relative semantic property and a possible world. So,
an expression denoting a world-relative semantic property may be tagged with a subscript
denoting a possible world to yield an expression denoting a world-indexed semantic property.
Using these concepts, I can now state the simple theory of rigidity in various ways. On this
theory, rigidity can be characterized as a mode of possessing world-relative semantic properties -
or alternatively, as a relation between expressions and world-relative semantic properties.
Construing rigidity as a mode, we get:
An expression E has a world-relative semantic property P rigidly iff E has P at every possible
world.
Or construing rigidity as a relation:
Rigid(E,P) iff E has P at every possible world.
Using the notion of a world-indexed semantic property, we can give the following alternative
statements of the theory:
An expression E has a world-relative semantic property P rigidly iff for all possible worlds w, E
has the world-indexed semantic property Pw.
Rigid(E,P) iff for all possible worlds w, E has Pw.
Note that, on this theory, rigidity is not a property that expressions have or lack simpliciter. We
need to specify what it is about the expression whose intralinguistic modal variability is in
question. Necessary truths are rigidly true, is a cat rigidly has only animals in its extension
(assuming that cats are necessarily animals), typical believers in bivalence will hold that all
statements with truth-values are rigidly truth-valued while some believers in truth-value gaps
will deny this, and so on. In general there is not just one useful rigidity distinction available for a
given category of expressions.
The original case of rigid designation for singular terms, and the contrast between names like
Aristotle and descriptions like The teacher of Alexander and The last great philosopher of
antiquity, can be understood in terms of this theory. Note that on this theory, ‘E is a rigid
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designator’ does not mean ‘E is rigid and E is a designator’. Rather, the idea is that E designates
rigidly, i.e. that E rigidly designates some object. Thus we may explicate the notion of rigid
designation for singular terms in the following way:
A singular term S is a rigid designator iff there is some object o such that S rigidly has the
world-relative semantic property of designating o.5
Now, this simple theory of rigidity may seem, as it were, too simple to be interesting. What is the
point of advancing such a jejune-sounding theory? It may seem like just the obvious sort of thing
one would come up with if asked, for some reason, to be unusually explicit about what one
means by rigidity when talking philosophy of language. The interest of the theory, in my view,
stems largely from the trouble that has arisen without it. There is a large and growing literature
on the problem of generalizing the notion of rigidity beyond singular terms. In the next section, I
will consider some existing proposals and difficulties facing them, focusing for concreteness on
the issue of extending the notion of rigidity to general terms or predicates. In Section 3 I explain
how the simple theory enables us to avoid these difficulties. Here the emphasis is largely on
description: once we generalize the notion of rigidity properly, we can use it to say the things we
want to say using that notion. In Section 4 I confront the issue of explanation. This is important,
since part of the point of talking about rigidity has been that we can use the notion of rigidity to
explain various modal phenomena. I largely follow Devitt (2005) in holding that the notion of
rigidity can provide explanations of modal phenomena, but that these explanations are only
moderately explanatory. I argue that this plausible view can be upheld given the simple theory.
2 Some existing proposals for generalizing the notion of rigidity
The sameness-of-extension proposal. If you have fallen into the trap of thinking of rigidity as a
monadic property of expressions, one first thought you might have is that, if rigidity for names is
sameness of referent across possible worlds, then perhaps we could say that rigidity for
predicates is sameness of extension across possible worlds. But this has struck many as a
non-starter: natural kind predicates that were supposed to count as rigid by Kripkean lights, like
is a cat or is a sample of water, will fail to do so, since particular cats and samples of water in the
actual world could have failed to exist. As Haukioja puts it:
[...] sameness of extension clearly cannot be the proper characterisation of rigidity
for predicates: the extension of a rigid predicate can vary from world to world.
(Haukioja (2006), p. 156.)
5 We may want to restrict our attention here to worlds in which o exists, so that e.g. Aristotle comes out as
a rigid designator even if there are worlds in which Aristotle does not exist. More on this issue at the end
of Section 3.
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The sameness-of-property proposal. Another natural thought is that a predicate is rigid iff it
designates, or expresses, the same property in all possible worlds. This at least yields the desired
Kripkean result that predicates like is a cat and is a sample of water come out as rigid. However,
the proposal seems to overgenerate: predicates that are supposed to contrast with these as regards
rigidity - e.g. is a superficially cat-like thing and is a sample of watery stuff - seem also to come
out as rigid on this proposal. (For discussion see Salmon (2004) and Schwartz (forthcoming,
§3).)
Now, it might be thought that even if this proposal does not allow us to make the distinctions
having to do with natural kinds which we might have wanted to make using the notion of
rigidity, it nevertheless enables us to make other distinctions that we want to make. For example,
if redness is (contingently) my favourite property, then can’t we say that is red is rigid and
possesses my favourite property is non-rigid? Perhaps, but even this is not straightforward: it
seems that in some sense the latter predicate also designates or expresses the same property
across possible worlds, namely the property of possessing my favourite property. (For discussion
see Martí (2004), de Sa (2007), Martí & Martínez-Fernández (2011) and Haraldsen (2018).)
A more complex version of the sameness-of-property proposal is defended, with caveats, in
Linsky (2006). Drawing on ideas of Lewis and, as an alternative, the notion of a ‘second order
definite description’ (the details don’t matter for our purposes), Linksy maintains:
Both Lewis’ account with double world indexes, and the second order definite
description account are able to make out a distinction between rigid and non-rigid
general terms. Admittedly this is at the cost of requiring a non-standard account of
much ordinary predication and a non-standard account of the formation of the
abstract singular terms that Soames uses, as well as expressions like ‘‘being F’’.
The payoff for all these complicated innovations, however, is to be able to give a
precise account of the notion that some general terms are rigid designators.
(Linsky (2006), pp. 664 - 665.)
But these ‘complicated innovations’ do not, Linsky admits, get us what we might have wanted
originally:
Even on this alternative account most general terms such as bachelor and red will
come out as rigid. (Linsky (2006), p. 665.)
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The rigid applier proposal. Devitt (2005), developing a proposal briefly given in Devitt &
Sterelny (1999, pp. 85-86), suggests the following extension of the notion of rigidity to general
terms:
[A] general term ‘F’ is a rigid applier iff it is such that if it applies to an object in
any possible world, then it applies to that object in every possible world in which
the object exists. Similarly for a mass term. (Devitt (2005), p. 146.)6
This proposal has been argued to be extensionally inadequate in both directions, given that we
want to be able to use the notion of rigidity to distinguish natural kind terms from other terms.
Schwartz (2002) argues that on this proposal, some terms for non-natural kinds, such as
television set, are predicted to be rigid appliers: according to Schwartz, anything which is a
television set in some possible world is a television set in all possible worlds in which it exists.
Schwartz argues further that some terms for natural kinds, such as frog, fail to come out as rigid
appliers: a given frog might have died while still a tadpole, had things gone differently.7
Devitt resists Schwartz’s contention that television set comes out as a rigid applier, arguing that
‘we need to distinguish what is essential to being a television set from what is essential to being
the object that happens to be a television set’ (Devitt (2005), p. 155). To be a television set,
Devitt argues, is to have a certain kind of function, but a given television set - that very object -
might have existed without having that function. On the other hand, Devitt is more inclined to
grant Schwartz’s contention about frog, ‘for the sake of argument at least’ (Devitt (2005), p.
155).
Issues with the status of Schwartz’s examples aside, Devitt’s position is that
even if these claims are right, they are not grounds for dissatisfaction. As I have
argued, it is a mistake to think that the primary task of the rigidity distinction is to
distinguish natural kind terms from nominal kind terms. The primary task is to
distinguish kind terms that are not covered by a description theory from ones that
are. (Devitt (2005), p. 154.)
From the present point of view, this talk of ‘the rigidity distinction’ runs the risk of suggesting
that, for a certain category of expressions, such as general terms or appliers, there is only room
for one rigidity distinction. But this is false. Devitt’s notion of a rigid applier is perfectly alright,
7 For further criticisms of the rigid applier proposal, involving hotter than and the status of colour-terms,
see Soames (2002, pp. 251 - 259).
6 Devitt (2005, f.n. 12) notes that a similar definition can be found in Cook (1980).
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but does not exhaust what can be said, even about appliers, by means of the notion of rigidity
properly generalized.
This is powerfully illustrated by the fact that even by Devitt’s lights, his notion of a rigid applier
falls subtly short of doing everything he wants from the notion of rigidity. Devitt explains and
admits this in the following passage:
(17′) Anything is water iff it is a liquid that is more common than any other on
Earth.
(18′) Anything is water iff it is H2O.
(17′) is indeed contingent: in some possible world gin might have been more
common than any other liquid on Earth. Yet (18′) is necessary: the water in any
possible world will be H2O and vice versa.
Sadly, these phenomena cannot be fully explained by appeal to rigidity. (18′)
determines that ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ apply to the same stuff in the actual world. The
rigidity of these terms then determines that these terms will still apply to that
actual stuff in any possible world in which it exists. But we are still short of
establishing the necessity of (18′). The problem is the nonactual stuff that the
terms refer to in other possible worlds. Rigidity determines that when one of the
terms applies to some nonactual stuff in a world it will do so also in any world
where that stuff exists. But that does not determine that the other term will apply
to that same stuff in those worlds, which is what we need to establish the
necessity. (Devitt (2005), p. 152.)
The simple theory has the power to alleviate Devitt’s sadness; while, as he explains, we cannot
use exactly his notion of a rigid applier to explain (18′)’s supposed necessity, there are8
rigidity-involving facts in the ballpark which can furnish a kind of explanation of (18′)’s
necessity. We can say that water rigidly applies to H2O, meaning that at all possible worlds w, the
term water applies to any H2O there is at w and to nothing else. And we can of course say the
same about H2O. (I will return to this example in Section 4 when I consider explicitly the
explanatory status of the notion of rigidity.)
8 It should be noted that the notion of an essentialist predicate - discussed by Soames (2002, p. 251) and
at length by Gómez-Torrente (2006) - can be applied to the predicates in (18′) to explain (18′)’s necessity.
But again, this notion tailor-made for predicates does not let us say everything that can be said about
predicates by means of the notion of rigidity properly generalized.
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The negative proposal. Problems affecting proposals like the above have led some authors to
give up on generalizing the notion of rigidity beyond singular terms. Witness Soames in Beyond
Rigidity:
I argue that there is no natural way of extending the concept of rigidity from
singular terms to predicates that vindicates the central doctrines of Naming and
Necessity. (Soames (2002), p. vii.)
Soames is not the only one. Arguing against LaPorte’s (2000) defense of a version of the
sameness-of-property proposal, Schwartz (2002) writes:
The notions of rigidity and non-rigidity do not usefully apply at all to kind or
other general terms. Extending the notion of rigidity from singular terms such as
proper names to general terms such as natural kind terms is a mistake. (Schwartz
(2002), p. 265.)
And later:
The rigid/non-rigid distinction is quite useful and indeed indispensable with
singular terms, but has been over-extended to general terms. (Schwartz (2002),
pp. 275 - 276.)
Another author who takes this line is Nimtz:
[...] an extensive debate has failed to secure a general notion of rigidity apt to play
the classificatory-cum-explanatory role Kripke characterizes in terms of rigidity.
(Nimtz (2019), pp. 332 - 333.)
Nimtz advocates looking for an alternative:
What are we to do, then? I propose that we look for an alternative to generalized
rigidity. (Nimtz (2019), p. 333.)
Nimtz’s suggested alternative, that of being a paradigm term (see his article for explanation),
may well be of substantial interest. Nevertheless, from the present point of view it is a mistake to
look for another monadic property of expressions that will do what we wanted from rigidity,
since it is a mistake to think of rigidity in general as a monadic property of expressions in the
first place. With the simple theory in hand we avoid these mistakes, and can generalize the
notion of rigidity with ease.
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3 The proper generalization
Questions like ‘When should a predicate count as rigid?’, at least in the absence of some special
convention, are not well-formed. An expression can do one thing (or be one way) rigidly while
doing another thing (or being another way) non-rigidly. The apparent problem of saying when a
predicate counts as rigid, and analogous problems for other kinds of expressions, dissolve once
this is appreciated.
On the other hand, some of the difficulties that arise when we try to extend the notion of a rigid
designator to non-singular terms do not automatically dissolve, but they are orthogonal to the
issue of extending the notion of rigidity. Do predicates designate? Do general terms like cat
designate? Do mass terms like water designate? What do they designate? Can they designate
more than one thing? These are not problems about extending the notion of rigidity - they are
problems about extending the notion of designation.
Given a clear account of what it means for an expression of a certain kind to designate something
at a world, we can then talk about rigid designation in connection with expressions of that kind.
(If for example we use designate in connection with predicates to express the traditional notion
of divided reference, so that a predicate may be said to designate each thing in its extension, we
may say that is a cat rigidly designates animals of a certain kind.) But perhaps some insights that
might sometimes have been put loosely by talking about rigid designation - and only sometimes;
in Naming and Necessity Kripke often makes the relevant points without using rigid at all - are
better put by talking about rigidity in some other connection.
All the relevant Kripkean semantic and modal insights - assuming that they are insights - can be
put in terms of rigidity in some way or other (and often more than one way). For example, we
might say that Water is H2O is necessary - rigidly true, in other words - because water rigidly
covers only H2O. The predicate is a sample of water rigidly has only samples of H2O in its
extension, whereas is a sample of watery stuff, while it may have only samples of H2O in its
actual extension - that depends on whether there is anything else watery in our world - doesn’t
rigidly have only samples of H2O in its extension. All cats are animals is necessary because cat
rigidly covers only animals. Everything that is a cat is an animal is necessary because the
extension of is a cat rigidly contains only animals. Heat rigidly applies only to molecular
motion, but pain - even if all the pain in our world involves the firing of C-fibers - does not
rigidly apply only to phenomena involving the firing of C-fibers. We can even express Kripke’s
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view of unicorns, or a strengthening of it, by saying that the extension of is a unicorn is rigidly9
empty. And so on. To be sure, the details of how we should put rigidity-related points may
sometimes be contentious, and may raise metasemantic issues associated with different sorts of
expressions. But these are not problems that especially concern the generalization of the notion
of rigidity.
The proper generalization also enables us to articulate, as special cases, the notions at work in the
proposals considered above. To capture the notion at work in the sameness-of-extension
proposal, we can speak of a predicate having its actual extension rigidly (e.g. is an even integer).
To capture the notions at work in the sameness-of-property proposal, we can speak of a predicate
rigidly expressing the property it expresses (and perhaps all predicates do this insofar as they
express properties at all), and we can also speak of a predicate (e.g. possesses my favourite
property) rigidly expressing the property it expresses while also non-rigidly ascribing, indirectly,
the property of redness. To capture the notion at work in the rigid applier proposal, we can speak
of an applier rigidly having in its extension any objects it has in its extension at any possible
world (if, that is, we understand this as qualified in such a way that these objects don’t need to
exist in all possible worlds - more on such qualifications in a moment).
We can even capture an insight from the negative proposal: insofar as we are confined to treating
the notion of rigidity as always designation-related, or always a property that expressions simply
have or lack, it may indeed be better not to bother trying to extend it beyond singular terms. We
could, I suppose, still ask ‘What is the best unqualified use of is rigid as said of expressions?’ -
either with regard to a particular category of expression, or across the board - but such a question
largely loses its interest once we have in hand the simple theory and the generalization it affords.
To conclude this section, a word on qualifications. In the proper name case, it is natural to
qualify the claim that names rigidly designate their actual referents by explicitly defining rigid
designator in terms of all the possible worlds in which the actual referent exists. (Some remarks
of Kripke’s have led people to think that this is his notion of rigidity, but other remarks strongly
suggest otherwise, e.g.: ‘If you say, “suppose Hitler had never been born” then “Hitler” refers
here, still rigidly, to something that would not exist in the counterfactual situation described.’ )10
But once rigidity is generalized, different qualifications may be natural in different cases. For
example, we might want to say ‘John loves Mary rigidly ascribes the loving relation to John and
Mary (in that order)’, and we might want this to come to the same thing as ‘John loves Mary
10 Kripke (1980, p. 78). See LaPorte (2008, §1.2) for discussion and further references.
9 See Kripke (1980, p. 24, pp. 157-158). Though many have taken Kripke’s remarks here to commit him
to the view that unicorns necessarily do not exist, Kripke pulls back from this, urging nevertheless that we
cannot say under which circumstances there would have been unicorns, with the result that we are unable
to make any clear case for the view that there might have been unicorns.
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ascribes the loving relation to John and Mary (in that order) at all possible worlds in which John
and Mary both exist’. But if we want to say ‘John loves the number 7 rigidly ascribes the loving
relation to John and the number 7 (in that order)’, we might be happy for this to come to the
same thing as ‘John loves the number 7 rigidly ascribes the loving relation to John and the
number 7 (in that order) at all possible worlds in which John exists’ (i.e., we don’t need our
qualification to cover the second relatum in this case, if it exists in all possible worlds).
If we want to allow such qualifications, one option is to think of rigid and cognates as having
different meanings depending on which qualifications we want to make. However, I suggest that
it is simpler to think of these terms as always meaning the same thing even when qualifications
are countenanced: invariance with respect to all relevant possible worlds. That way we do not
have to keep track of different definitions of the terminology of rigidity, and may achieve the
desired results by, either implicitly or explicitly, restricting our attention to the appropriate range
of possible worlds (which may be characterised by the existence in them of various referents or
extension-members, but also in any number of other ways). Going explicit, we may say things
like ‘Confining our attention to worlds in which Socrates exists, Socrates rigidly designates
Socrates’ and ‘Confining our attention to worlds in which their actual referents exist, non-empty
proper names are rigid designators’.
4 Explaining modal phenomena
So far I have largely confined myself to arguing that the simple theory allows us to say what
philosophers have wanted to say using the notion of rigidity. But the notion of rigidity has not
only been regarded as offering us a way of describing how things stand with expressions of
various kinds. It has also been regarded as giving us the means to explain various phenomena,
such as the modal status of certain statements. For example, the necessity of an identity
statement like Cicero is Tully may be explained by pointing out that the names involved are rigid
designators. If the names both designate their actual referent in all worlds in which that referent
exists, and never designate anything else, then - together with the fact that an identity statement
involving proper names is true when the names involved designate the same object - it follows
that Cicero is Tully, or at least If Cicero exists, then Cicero is Tully, is a necessary truth. Thus we
get a kind of explanation of the modal status of a certain statement couched in terms of the
notion of rigidity.
Similarly, not just overall modal status, but various aspects of the modal profiles of certain
statements may be explained, after a fashion, using the notion of rigidity. As Devitt notes, the
pair of statements Aristotle was fond of dogs and The last great philosopher of antiquity was fond
of dogs have different modal profiles: whether the first is true at a world w depends on whether,
at w, the individual we in the actual world designate with Aristotle is fond of dogs. This is not in
12
general the case with the second statement. This difference in modal profile may be explained by
means of the fact that Aristotle is a rigid designator while The last great philosopher of antiquity
is not.
Now, explanations of this sort may leave something to be desired. (Devitt calls them ‘rather
superficial’ .) But make no mistake, they are the paradigms of how rigidity is supposed to be11
explanatory, and analogous explanations can be given using the notion of rigidity in other
connections. We have already touched on this kind of explanation, but let us illustrate in a bit
more detail with Devitt’s example (18′) discussed in Section 2 - the necessity of Anything is
water iff it is H2O - which brought out a subtle limitation of his notion of a rigid applier. Granting
orthodox assumptions about the example for the sake of illustration, the necessary truth of this
statement may be explained by the fact that both water and H2O rigidly apply to H2O. In other
words, at all possible worlds w, water has the property applying to H2O, i.e. applying to any H2O
there is and to nothing else. This means that Anything is water iff it is H2O isn’t false at any
world, since for it to be false at a world w there would have to be some stuff at w to which one of
water and H2O applies and the other does not, which is ruled out by their both rigidly applying to
H2O. Likewise, the possible falsity of Anything is watery stuff iff it is H2O may be explained by
the fact that watery stuff, unlike both water and H2O, does not rigidly apply to H2O. I.e. it is not
the case that watery stuff applies to H2O at all worlds. I.e. at some worlds, watery stuff applies to
some stuff that is not H2O. That stuff constitutes a counterexample to Anything is watery stuff iff
it is H2O, hence the latter is false at some worlds.
Admittedly, there is one thing that we don’t get from the simple theory of rigidity: we don’t get a
single monadic property of expressions that figures in all of these explanations. But so what?
The notion of rigidity is still a single, unified idea. Metaphysically, we may think of rigidity
“adverbially”, as a mode of having properties, and then we can say that it’s the same thing in
question every time. Or we might think of it as a relation between expressions and world-relative
semantic properties. And there are certainly further options. The theory of rigidity in this paper is
not a metaphysical theory about what kind of thing rigidity itself is. (I’m not sure whether there’s
any real point in theorizing about rigidity in that way, but if there is, I don’t pretend to be
delivering those goods.) Rather, I’ve offered a kind of analysis, or fruitful definition, of the
notion of rigidity. And however we think of rigidity itself metaphysically, one and the same
notion of rigidity may be used in various connections to give a kind of explanation of various
modal phenomena. These explanations may leave something to be desired, but that is true even
in the paradigm case of names. So again, once we free ourselves from thinking of rigidity as a
monadic property of expressions, we get a simple solution to the problem of generalizing the
notion of rigidity.
11 Devitt (2005, p. 159).
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